Life cycle wage and job changes by Ed Nosal & Peter Rupert
working
paper
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
0212
Life Cycle Wage and Job Changes
by Ed Nosal and Peter RupertWorking papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland are preliminary materials
circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment on research in progress. They may not
have been subject to the formal editorial review accorded official Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland publications. The views stated herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily
those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System.
Working papers are now available electronically through the Cleveland Fed’s site on the World
Wide Web: www.clev.frb.org.Ed Nosal is at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and may be contacted at Ed.Nosal@clev.frb.org or
(216) 579-2021.  Peter Rupert is at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland and may be contacted at
Peter.C.Rupert@clev.frb.org or (216) 579-2040.  The authors thank Rob Shimer, Richard Rogerson,
Randy Wright, and participants at the SED meetings 2002, and NBER Summer Institute.
Working Paper 02-12 September 2002
 
Life Cycle Wage and Job Changes
by Ed Nosal and Peter Rupert
Evidence from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics shows that while the majority of job changers who
state they were not fired or laid off choose jobs with wages that are higher than their previous jobs, a
substantial proportion of these job changers choose jobs that have lower wages.  A model is constructed
that is consistent with workers choosing a career path that entails a job change to either a higher paying or
lower paying job.  In the model, a job consists of a tied wage and amenity package.  Due to compensating
wage differentials, higher wages are paid where other job amenities are unattractive.  Given this, a worker
chooses a career path that leads to a job change where the wage in the new job may be higher or lower
than in the previous job, with the actual choice being determined by the rate of time preference.
JEL Classification: J0, J3, J6
Key Words: lifetime wage profile, occupation choice, job changes1 Introduction
In the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) it is possible to identify workers who have changed
employers voluntarily.1 That is, workers who report they were neither ﬁred nor subject to a layoff
or shutdown. While the majority of the voluntary leavers move to new jobs that pay more than
their previous job, a surprisingly substantial proportion (approximately 42%) move to new jobs
where the wages are actually lower.2
Why might people quit their higher paying jobs and move into lower paying ones? While
there are many potential explanations, this paper models wages as only one component of a job.3
That is, jobs consist of a tied wage and amenity package, with higher wages in jobs with higher
levels of the disamenity. In a dynamic or life cycle context, it is entirely possible for a worker to
choose a career path that leads to a job change where the observed wage is lower but the (perhaps
unobserved) working conditions are better than in their previous job. Examples might include:
Bond traders or stock brokers who work in high paying but also high stress and long hours jobs;
sales jobs that require extensive travel; dangerous or risky jobs, and so on.
In this paper workers change employers without the arrival of new information. A model is
constucted that allows workers to choose their career path over various jobs, where a job is deﬁned
by a wage and amenity combination, in a setting of complete information. Some workers will
initially choose low paying jobs and will migrate to higher paying ones. Other workers will follow
1Although in principle it is difﬁcult to know whether a separation is voluntary or involuntary, the question in the
PSID asks workers to choose from several reasons as to why they left their last job, one of which being that they chose
to leave.
2The model makes no distinction between employer changes or job changers, though in the PSID the question
concerns employer changes. However, in this paper, job and employer changes are used interchangeably.
3Hwang, Mortensen, and Reed (1998) have amenities in a search model but focus on how hedonic wage models
can be biased if search is introduced.
1precisely the oppositestrategy. The keyvariable that determinesthe choice of jobsoverthe lifetime
is the worker’s rate of time preference. Workers who have a relatively high rate of time preference
will move to higher paying jobs over their lifetimes, while those who have a relatively low rate of
time preference will move to lower paying jobs.
The movement of workers from high to lower paying jobs has proved somewhat troublesome
for standard search models of the labor market. For example, while job changes in search models
can be achieved through the arrival of new information or exogenous job destruction, to get indi-
viduals to move to lower paying jobs workers must go through a spell of unemployment and revise
down their reservation wage, leading to acceptance of a lower paying job. However, the data show
that most workers who change employers do so with no intervening unemployment spell (Matilla
(1974); Akerlof, Rose, and Yellen (1988)).
Another reason workers may move to a job with a lower level of wages is that the rate of
growth of wages is higher with the new employer. Examination of the PSID shows little difference
between wage growth before and after the employer change.
Section 2 describes the data for workers who change employers in the PSID. Section 3 presents
the model. Section 3.4 provides some intuition and extensions. Section 4 concludes.
2 Employer Changers in the PSID
Between 1984 and 1992 the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) asked individualsabout their
current and previous employer. For those workers who changed employers, a number of questions
were asked: Their reasons for leaving the last employer; their wage with the last and current
employer; when they left their last employer and when they began their current employment. The
2actual question for 1989 in the PSID and choice of response was:4
Question: What happened with that employer—did the company go out of business, were you
(HEAD) laid off, did you quit, or what?
Responses:
1. Company folded/changed hands/moved out of town; employer died/went out of business
1989
2. Strike; lockout
3. Laid off; ﬁred
4. Quit; resigned; retired; pregnant; needed more money; just wanted a change in jobs; was
self- employed before
5. Other; transfer; any mention of armed services
6. Job was completed; seasonal work; was a temporary job
7. NA; DK
8. Inap.: not working for money now; no other main-job employer during 1988; still working
for other employer
After respondingthat an employer change took place, some follow-up questionswere asked. In
particular the worker was asked: How much their wage was when the job ended with their previous
employer, how much they earned when they started with their new employer. In addition, the date
of the ending of the last job and beginning of the current job was also asked. Reported wages were
converted to real wages using the monthly CPI since the dates of job endings and beginnings are
given as a month within the year.
For the nine years of data (1984-1992) containing the above question, there are 42,765 ob-
servations where the respondent had positive income, was either head of the household or spouse
of the head, and between the ages 18 and 70. The numbers in Table 1 and Table 2 are averages
4The question and responses are slightly different for some years.
3using all employer changes throughout all of the years. That is, each job change is considered one
observation and no account is taken of the fact that some individuals in the data change employers
several times while others may change only once.
From that population there were 3,599 people who changed employers for any reason. Table 1
shows summary statistics for all employer changers in the PSID from 1984-1992.
Table 1: All Job Changers
To Lower Wage To Same Wage To Higher Wage
mean std. mean std. mean std.
% of Job Changers 0.421 0.494 0.084 0.277 0.495 0.500
Age 33.6 9.62 34.5 10.2 32.6 9.06
Months Between Jobs 1.49 2.03 0.003 .057 0.906 1.51
￿
3,599
However, as mentioned above, this paper is concerned with those workers who answered with
response #4. Table 2 provides summary statistics for those who changed employers voluntarily.
There were 2,313 observations of employer changes between 1984 and 1992.
Though the majority of voluntary job changers, 53%, move to higher paying jobs, a very large
proportion of voluntary job changers, 42.5%, move to jobs that pay lower wages. There is very
little difference in age between those movingto higher or lower paying jobs, around 32-33 years of
age. The median percentage change in real wages for those movingto lower paying jobs is -17.8%,
while the median for those moving to higher paying jobs is nearly 20%, as can be seen in table 3.
Another reason to change jobs would be to move to a job that has the potential for higher wage
growth than the current job. Although it is possible to track wage growth before and after the
4Table 2: Voluntary Job Changers
To Lower Wage To Same Wage To Higher Wage
mean std. mean std. mean std.
% of Job Changers 0.424 0.494 0.048 0.214 0.528 0.499
Age 32.7 9.13 33.4 10.8 32.0 8.58
Months Between Jobs 1.32 1.88 0.009 .095 0.920 1.50
￿
2,313
Table 3: Wage Changes (%) for Voluntary Job Changers
Quantiles
10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
moved to:
lower wages -2.03 -7.46 -17.8 -40.5 -72.5
higher wages 4.08 9.43 19.8 41.4 73.6
5switch, the PSID only asked these job change questions between 1984 and 1992, so that there are
not many years before or after the job change. In any event, it is possible to look at those who
changed jobs exactly in the middle year of the data, 1988, and examine their wage growth four
years before and four years after the job change. The results show very little difference between
wage growth before and after the employer change. However, with so few years of data before and
after the employer change, this result should be viewed with caution.
3 The Model
The model allows for job choice over the life cycle. Workers are born at date 0 and live for one
period of continuous time. Job choice, is limited to a discrete number of wage/working condition
packages. Within a job, working conditions or “job amenity” is ﬁxed. A worker can only alter the
job amenity by changing jobs.









￿ is characterized by
a constant returns to scale production function and a ﬁxed level of the amenity,
￿
￿
￿ . At each instant
in time workers inelastically supply one unit of labor to the production function in the speciﬁc job













￿ represent the average and marginal product of labor for job
￿ . The labor market is




￿ for each unit of labor supplied.
Agent’s preferences are deﬁned over a private consumption good,




Agents discount the future at rate
￿ and can borrow and lend at interest rate
￿ . The momentary
utility function for an agent choosing job































6Given our speciﬁcation of preferences,
￿




￿ can be positive, negative, or even zero.





















































￿ , is not
“too big”, all of the results in this paper remain valid.5 In order to motivate the incentive to change














￿ . One interpretation is that jobs
where working conditions are not as pleasant pay a higher wage.
At each date




￿ will be used to indicate the
worker’s job choice at date

















￿ , then the worker chooses job
￿ at date
￿ . The worker’s total savings (or stock of wealth) at
date




￿ . The instanteous change in the worker’s wealth at date
￿ is given the sum



















































































































































































5If the difference in momentary utility is substantial, workers would never choose the low utility job. Equating the
momentary utilities greatly simpliﬁes the mathematics.
7The objective function (3) is the worker’s lifetime utility. Equation (4) describes how the worker’s
wealth changes over time. The equations contained in (5) simply say that the worker begins life
with no wealth and (optimally) ends his life with no wealth.
The (current value) Hamiltonian,
￿ , associated with the maximization problem
￿ (3),(4),(5)
￿





















































































































































































































Differentiating (6) with respect to






















































￿ , then consumption





￿ , then consumption is strictly decreasing







￿ , then consumption is constant.































































































In other words, if at date












￿ , then at date
￿ it is
optimal for the worker to be at job
￿ ; if at date












￿ , then at date
￿ it is optimal for the worker to be at job
￿ .
The worker will always change jobs (at least once) over his lifetime. To see this suppose that









￿ the worker’s level of consumption must equal
￿
￿ . If the worker spends his entire lifetime
























































































































is a strictly concave function, the right hand side of (12) must be strictly greater than the left hand

















￿ , which, by (11), implies that the
worker will not stay at job 1 for his entire lifetime.









￿ his consumption will equal
￿
5












































































which, by (11), contradicts the assertion that the worker will spend his entire lifetime in job 2.













￿ , it is not possible for the worker to ever move from job 2 to job 1. If the worker
did follow such a sequence, then consumption would necessarily have to fall after the job change,
see (11). But when
￿
￿
￿ , the worker’s optimal consumption stream, implicitly given by (10), is
strictly increasing over his lifetime. Hence, the only possible equilibrium job choice strategy for
the worker is to spend the ﬁrst part of life at job 1 and the second part in job 2. Here, workers are
moving from a higher wage job to a lower wage job. This sequence of job choices is consistent
with a strictly increasing lifetime consumption proﬁle, i.e., consistent with (11). Note that the
worker will change jobs only once; if the worker changed jobs more than once then the level of
consumption associated with the second job change, given by (11), would be inconsistent with a










￿ , (10) implies that the worker’s lifetime consumption proﬁle is strictly decreasing over
his lifetime. Hence, it is not possible for the worker to change from job 1 to job 2 since, for this
sequencing of job choices, (11) would not be consistent with a strictly decreasing consumption
proﬁle. The equilibrium job choice strategy for the worker is to spend the ﬁrst part of life at job
2 and the second part of his life in job 1; these workers move from lower to higher paying jobs.
This sequence of job choice is consistent with a strictly decreasing lifetime consumption proﬁle,






When the discount rate equals the interest rate, (10) implies that the worker’s lifetime consumption
stream will be constant. Since the worker changes jobs at least once and his lifetime consumption


















The worker’s initial job choice and the number of times he changes jobs will now be deter-






















































￿ in terms of “discounted time.” That is,
￿ represents the discounted


































































￿ . If the worker’s initial job choice is, say, job 1, and he changes
job













































































￿ and that for a given
￿ ,
￿ is just a number.


















































































































￿ , equation (15) is simply an equation in
one unknown,
￿




































Above, it has been assumed that the worker’s initial job choice is job 1, he changes jobs
￿ times
and his last job is job 2. But there is nothing special about this sequencing of job choices. All that
is required is that the worker spend
￿
￿










of discounted time in job 2. It does not matter where the worker’s initial job is, how many times






discounted time in job 1 and the remainder in job 2.
In summary, the sign of
￿
￿
￿ determines whether the worker moves from a high paying job
to a low paying one or from the low paying job to a higher paying one. When
￿
￿
￿ , the worker
changes jobs once and moves from the high to low paying job. When
￿
￿
￿ , the worker also




￿ the worker will change
jobs at least once and he is indifferent between job 1 and job 2 as his ﬁrst job.
3.4 Discussion
3.4.1 Initial Job Choice
The intuition behind the choice of an initial job is easiest to see by ﬁxing the amount of time spent
in the ﬁrst job. Job 1, the higher wage job, provides higher lifetime income than job 2; and, the
higher the interest rate,
￿ , the greater will be the difference in lifetime incomes. So, as the interest
12rate increases job 1 looks more and more attractive as a starting job. Conversely, job 2, as an intitial
job choice, provides a higher lifetime amenity stream so that as the discount rate,
￿ , rises, job 2




￿ the “interest rate” effect associated with taking job 1 ﬁrst dominates the “discount
rate” effect of taking job 1 ﬁrst. So, lifetime utility is higher when job 1 is chosen ﬁrst. When
￿
￿
￿ the “discount rate” effect dominates the “interest rate” effect, leading to higher lifetime
utility by choosing job 2 ﬁrst. When
￿
￿
￿ , the “interest rate effect” associated with taking job 1
ﬁrst exactly offsets the “discount rate effect” associated with taking job 2 ﬁrst, implying that the






In order to gain some intuition as to why individuals change jobs, assume that a worker lives for
only an instant of time. As a ﬁrst approximation, this allows us to ignore discounting.6 Imagine
that in this instant unit of time the worker spends a fraction





￿ in job 2. Over this
instant of time ﬁnancial markets permit the worker to smooth his consumption of the market good,
















￿ . But, of course, the worker
is unable to smooth the consumption of the amenity since the amenity is job speciﬁc. Hence, if

































￿ . If the worker spends the entire instant
of time in either job 1 or job 2, i.e., the worker does not change jobs, then his utility is equal to
6Discounting is important in terms of explaining which job the worker will initially take but is not that important









￿ , although the worker is indifferent





￿ , he is not indifferent between changing and not changing jobs; he strictly



















































































































































￿ , inequality (16) holds.



















￿ and the only way that they can consume an average of the bundles
is by changing jobs. 7
3.5 Extensions
3.5.1 Worker Heterogeneity
In the data, some individuals move from lower to higher paying jobs and other individuals move
from higher to lower paying jobs. The model can be made consistent with both of these observed
facts if workers are heterogeneous. For example, one simple form of heterogeneity is that different
workers have different discount rates. Let
￿
!
￿ be the discount rate for worker
￿ . One can imagine
that there is a population of workers and a distribution of discount rates over this population. All
workers




￿ , will spend the ﬁrst






￿ will spend the ﬁrst part of the life at the high paying job and the second
part at the low paying job. Hence, heterogeneity along the worker discount rate dimension can
generate ﬂows of workers moving from low to high paying jobs and at the same time ﬂows of
7Our speciﬁcation of preferences are not the only ones that imply that the worker will want to change jobs. Pref-
erences that are additively separable or CES will also imply that workers will want to change jobs. However, if the






























￿ , the worker will
not change jobs.
14workers moving from high to low paying jobs.
It might be interesting to know which workers starting at, say job 1 (workers with relativey
low discount rates), will be the ﬁrst to change jobs; the higher discount rate workers or the lower?
It turns out that it is not possible to get an analytical solution to this answer, however, numerical










￿ . Note that
￿
































￿ . The interest rate,
￿ is set equal to
0.05 and
￿ varies between 0.001 and 0.1. Qualitatively speaking, the numerical results for other
parameter values are the same as those presented below as long as the difference in wages is not
“too small” and
￿ is economically reasonable, i.e., values of
￿ corresponding to discount factors










￿ as the fraction of time spent in the initial job where the initial job is
￿ . For the param-
eters chosen, it turns out that, independent of the location of the starting job, workers with a higher
discount rate will change jobs ﬁrst, see Figures 1 and 2. In fact, for economically revelant values
of
￿ and, as long as the difference between the wages is not “too small”, numerical simulations
indicate that the time spent in the ﬁrst job is a strictly decreasing monotonic function of
￿ . For val-
ues of







￿ may display a non-monotonicity.
Speciﬁcally, as
￿ increases, it is possible that in some region
￿
￿




￿ is again a monotonically decreasing function of (higher)
￿ ’s. When the difference
between the wages is “not big”
￿
￿
￿ may display a similiar non-monotonicity over a range of
￿ ’s.
8Or more to the point, only three of the four job parameters can be chosen independently, the fourth being deter-
mined by (2)
153.5.2 Many Jobs
Except for the knife-edge case where
￿
￿
￿ , workers will change jobs exactly once in their life-
times. In reality, however, some workers may “never” change jobs or other workers may change
jobs more than once over their lifetimes.
The model can be generalized along two dimensions. Suppose ﬁrst that the instantaneous
utilities associated with each job need not be equal. 9 Second, suppose that instead of facing two
possible job choices each worker is randomly given
￿
￿
￿ jobs to choose from over his lifetime.
Without loss of generality, let job
￿ be the “best” job and job













































If it turns out that the instantaneous utility of job 1 is substantially higher than job 2, then the
worker chooses job 1 at date
￿
￿
￿ and will never change jobs. The case considered in the body
of the paper can be interpreted by having the instantaneous utilities of job 1 and job 2 not being
signiﬁcantly different from one another, but the instantaneous utility of job 2 substantially larger
than job 3. In this situation, the worker will change jobs once: which job the worker chooses ﬁrst




￿ . In general, if the instantaneous utilitiesassociated with the ﬁrst
￿














job, then the worker will change jobs
￿
times. So by increasing the number of
jobs available to workers and by relaxing the assumption that instantaneous utility of all jobs are




























has been assumed for analytical reasons. By continuity, all of our results




























but are “close” in value to one another. Clearly, if the instantaneous utility
associated with one job is signiﬁcantly higher than another then the worker will choose the “high” utility job and will
not change jobs.
164 Conclusions
Individuals may rationally choose to move from high paying jobs to lower paying ones as part
of an optimal lifetime plan. A key insight to this observation is that a job is more than just a
wage; workers also care about non-wage dimensions of a job. In the data, the majority of workers
who voluntarily change jobs, move to higher wages. Our model would identify these individual
as having “relatively high” discount rates. The data also document that a large proportion of
voluntary job changers move to lower paying jobs. Our model would identify these workers as
patient, “relatively low” discount rate individuals.
17Figure 1: Moving Time: Job 1 to Job 2









Figure 2: Moving Time: Job 2 to Job 1











AKERLOF, G. A., A. K. ROSE, AND J. L. YELLEN, “Job Switching and Job Satisfaction in the
U.S. Labor Market,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 495–594.
HWANG, H.-S., D. T. MORTENSEN, AND W. R. REED, “Hedonic Wages and Labor Market
Search,” Journal of Labor Economics 16 (1998), 815–847.












Please send corrected mailing label to the
Federal  Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 
Research Department, 
P. O. Box 6387, 
Cleveland, OH 44101